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COMPARISON OF IMPASSE
PROCEDURES: THE NEW YORK CITY
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING LAW AND
THE NEW YORK STATE TAYLOR LAW
I. Introduction
The importance of resolving impasses' that arise during the
course of collective bargaining in the public sector has increased as
a result of the rapid unionization of public employees at the fed-
eral, state, and local levels.2 This increase in the number of organ-
ized public employees has been accompanied by a growth in the
volume of public sector strikes.' Speedy resolution of these dis-
putes is often critical due to the essential nature of the jobs per-
formed by many public sector employees, and has caused numer-
ous state and local governments to reformulate the laws governing
public sector labor relations.'
In the private sector, a union which attempts to expedite the
settlement process by engaging in a strike is protected by statute.6
In the public sector, however, strikes by state" and federal7 em-
1. An impasse in the public sector has been defined as the "failure of a public employer
and the exclusive representative to achieve agreement in the course of good-faith negotia-
tions .. " Board of Educ. v. Hawaii Pub. Employment Rel. Bd., 56 Haw. 85, 87, 528 P.2d
809, 811 (1974). The National Labor Relations Board's finding of a deadlock in negotiations
is equivalent to finding that negotiations are at an impasse. Newspaper Drivers & Handlers
Local No. 372 v. NLRB, 404 F.2d 1159, 1160 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 923
(1969). See note 33 infra for the Taylor Law's definition of an impasse.
2. SPERO AND CAPOZZOLA, THE URBAN COMMUNITY AND ITS UNIONIZED BUREAUCRACIES 15
(1973) ("In 1944 only 540,000 public employees were members of unions; in 1955 those or-
ganized numbered 900,000; but by 1971 more than three million state and local workers held
union or associate membership cards.").
3. See D. LEWIN, PUBLIC SECTOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND THE RIGHT TO STRIKE, re-
printed in D. Lewin, P. Feuille, & T. Kochan, Public Sector Labor Relations, 237, 239
(1977) [hereinafter cited as PUBLIC SECTOR LABOR RELATIONS] ("Before 1966 work stoppages
were limited to an average of 29 per year. However, between 1966 and 1974 there were
approximately 319 strikes. Between 1958 and 1965 the number of workers involved in public
sector strikes averaged less than 3,900 per year, in contrast to almost 176,000 over the 1966
to 1974 period.").
4. See note 12 infra and accompanying text.
5. "Employees shall have the right to . . . engage in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection .. " 29 U.S.C. § 157
(1976). See NLRB v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 346 U.S. 464 (1953).
6. See, e.g., Alabama: ALA. CODE §§ 11-43-143 (1977) (covers state and municipal
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ployees are statutorily prohibited except in a few limited in-
stances.8 The ban on strikes in the public sector has eliminated the
use of a weapon long regarded as necessary for unions to achieve
their objectives. The primary rationale9 for the elimination of
strikes in the public sector is to prevent the disruption of essential
services performed by government employees.' 0 Past experience,
however, indicates that unions, irrespective of statutory penalties,'
firefighters); California: CAL. LAB. CODE § 1962 (West) (covers firefighters); Florida: FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 447.201 (West Supp. 1981) (covers state and local employees, police,
firefighters and teachers); New York: N.Y. CIv. SERV. LAW § 210 (McKinney 1973) (covers
state and local employees, police, firefighters and teachers); North Dakota N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 15-38.1-14.1 (1971) (covers teachers). See also 10 T. KHEEL, LABOR LAW § 57.04 (2d ed.
1979) [hereinafter cited as T. KHEEL].
7. "An individual may not accept or hold a position in the Government of the United
States . . . if he . . . participates in a strike, or asserts the right to strike, against the Gov-
ernment of the United States .. " 5 U.S.C. § 7311(3) (1976). See also United Fed'n of
Postal Clerks v. Blount, 325 F. Supp. 879, 884 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 404 U.S. 802 (1971) ("Con-
gress has an obligation to ensure that the machinery of the Federal Government continues
to function at all times without interference. Prohibition of strikes by its employees is a
reasonable implementation of that obligation.").
8. A limited right to strike has been authorized by statute in certain jurisdictions. See
Alaska: ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.200 (1972) (permitted for all employees except police,
firefighters, correctional employees, and hospital workers); Hawaii: HAWAII REV. STAT. § 89-
12(b), (c) (1976) (permitted if public health and safety are not endangered, but requires a 60
day waiting period after fact-finding and a 10 day notice of intention to strike); Minnesota:
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 179.64(1)(a)(d)(3), 179.68(2)(9) (West Supp. 1981) (permitted if em-
ployer refuses to comply with binding arbitration award or refuses request for binding arbi-
tration); Montana: MONT. REV. CODES ANN. 59-1603 (1977) (all public employees have the
right to strike for the purposes of binding arbitration); Oregon: OR. REV. STAT. § 243.726
(1979) (permitted if all impasse resolution procedures have been exhausted, but may be
enjoined if public health, safety or welfare is endangered; prohibited to police and fire, OR.
REV. STAT. § 243.736 (1979) who have binding arbitration instead, OR. REV. STAT. § 243.742
(1979)); Pennsylvania: PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.1003 (Purdon 1980) (similar to Ore-
gon); Vermont: VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21 § 1730 (1978) (a strike is prohibited and enjoinable
only if it occurs within 30 days of fact-finder's report, or after submission to arbitration, or
if it is shown to endanger public health, safety or welfare). See generally 9 T. KHEEL, supra
note 6, at § 43.08.
9. Two other rationales for prohibiting public sector employees from striking are: (1) the
government is sovereign and its employees have no right to strike; and (2) public employee
unions are in an especially strong position negotiating with a monopolist - permitting them
to strike would cause substantial costs on the taxpaying public since there is often no alter-
native to their services. PUBLIC SECTOR LABOR RELATIONS, supra note 3, at 239.
10. Id. See also Board of Educ. v. New Jersey Educ. Ass'n, 53 N.J. 29, 37-38, 247 A.2d
867, 872 (1968).
11. A number of state laws provide severe penalties against public employee strikers,
their union, and the strike leaders. See, e.g., N.Y. CIv. SERV. LAW § 210 (McKinney 1973);
TEx. LABOR CODE ANN. tit. 83 § 5154a(11) (Vernon 1971). In New York, in addition to being
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will tend to disregard strike prohibitions if there is no reasonable
alternative to pursue."
Many states have enacted statutes which offer viable alternatives
to unions that wish to press their demands at the negotiation table
but have been stripped of their power to conduct a lawful strike.13
These alternatives include mediation,'4 fact-finding" and a varia-
tion of interest arbitration.'" These methods of dispute resolution
are offered as the quid pro quo for the ban on strikes.
New York's earliest statutory response to strikes in the public
sector was the Condon-Wadlin Act of 1947,'7 which prohibited
strikes by public employees and levied severe, if not draconian,
penalties for violations of the prohibition. 8 The Condon-Wadlin
subject to statutory penalties for disregarding strike prohibitions, public employees and
their unions may also be subject to criminal and civil liability. Caso v. Dist. Council 37, 43
A.D.2d 159, 350 N.Y.S.2d 173 (2a1 Dep't 1973); People v. Vizzini, 78 Misc. 2d 1040, 359
N.Y.S.2d 1430 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
12. See 10 T. KHEEL, supra note 6, at § 57.01.
13. See, e.g., Maine: ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26 §§ 961-972 (1974); Michigan: MICH.
CoMP. LAWS §§ 423.201-.216 (1978); New York: N.Y. CIv. SERV. LAW §§ 200-214 (McKinney
1973); Wisconsin: Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 111.80-.94 (West 1974).
14. See, e.g., Florida: FLA. STAT. ANN. § 447.403(1) (West Supp. 1981); Iowa: IOWA CODE
§ 20.20 (1978); Michigan: MICH. COMP. LAWS § 423.207 (1978); New York: N.Y. Civ. SERV.
LAW § 209(3)(a) (McKinney 1973). See also 10 T. KHEEL, supra note 6, at § 56.03 n.3.
15. See, e.g., Indiana: IND. CODE § 20-7.5-1-12(d) (1975); Massachusetts: MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN., ch. 150E, § 9 (West 1976); Nevada: NEV. REV. STAT. § 288.200 (1979); New York:
N.Y. CIv. SERV. LAW § 209(3)(b) (McKinney 1973); Pennsylvania: PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43 §
1101.802(1) (Purdon Supp. 1980). See also 10 T. KHEEL, supra note 6, at § 56.04 n.2.
16. See, e.g., Alaska: ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.200 (1972); Delaware: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19,
§ 1310 (1979); Iowa: IOWA CODE § 20.22 (1978); New York: N.Y. CIv. SERV. LAW § 209(4)(c)
(McKinney 1973); Vermont: VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1733(a) (1978). See also 10 T. KHEEL,
supra note 6, at § 56.05 n.2.
17. 1958 N.Y. Laws ch. 790.
18. The Condon-Wadlin Act provided that: "No person holding a position by appoint-
ment or employment in the government ... shall strike .... [Any public employee who
violates the provisions of this section shall thereby abandon and terminate his appointment
or employment and shall no longer hold such position . . . except if appointed or reap-
pointed." 1958 N.Y. Laws ch. 790, § 108. The Act further provides that an employee can be
reappointed only under the following conditions:
(a) his compensation shall in no event exceed that received by him immediately prior
to the time of such violation; (b) the compensation of such person shall not be in-
creased until after the expiration of three years from such . . . reappointment .. .;
and (c) such person shall be on probation for a period of five years following . . .
reappointment . . . during which period he shall serve without tenure and at the
pleasure of the appointing officer. . . .
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Act proved to be ineffectual because its penalties were so severe
that they were rarely imposed, thereby giving unions little incen-
tive to refrain from striking. 9 Contending that New York needed a
more effective method of resolving public sector disputes, Gover-
nor Rockefeller convened the Governor's Committee on Public
Employee Relations in 1966, also known as the Taylor Committee.
This committee proposed legislation20 that led to the passage in
1967 of the New York Public Employees' Fair Employment Act,2
commonly known as the Taylor Law.2
The Taylor Law not only prescribes rules and procedures for
public employees in the State of New York, but also permits any
public employer2 to enact different "provisions and procedures '24
for the regulation of its own employees as long as these provisions
and procedures are "substantially equivalent"25 to those found in
the Taylor Law.2 Pursuant to this option, New York City enacted
the New York City Collective Bargaining Law27 ("NYCCBL")
which established procedures for the resolution of bargaining im-
19. The ineffectiveness of the Condon-Wadlin Act was apparent during the 1966 transit
strike in New York City. This 12 day strike cost New Yorkers an estimated one billion
dollars, mainly in lost wages and retail sales. See Morris, Public Policy and the Law Relat-
ing to Collective Bargaining in the Public Service, 22 Sw. L. J. 585, 585-86 (1968) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Public Policy and the Law]; Taylor, Public Employment: Strikes or Proce-
dures?, 20 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 617, 631 (1966).
20. STATE OF NEW YORK, GOVERNOR'S COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS FINAL
REPORT, (March 31, 1966) [hereinafter cited as GOVERNOR'S FINAL REPORT].
21. N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW §§ 200-214 (McKinney 1973 & Supp. 1981).
22. See generally Taylor, Public Employment: Strikes or Procedures?, 20 INDUS. & LAB.
REL. REV. 617 (1966).
23. The Taylor Law defines "public employer" as:
(i) the state of New York, (ii) a county, city, town, village or any other political subdi-
vision or civil division of the state, (iii) a school district or any governmental entity
operating a public school, college or university, (iv) a public improvement or special
district, (v) a public authority, commission, or public benefit corporation, or (vi) any
other public corporation, agency or instrumentality or unit of government which exer-
cises governmental powers under the laws of the state.
N.Y. CIv. SERV. LAW § 201(6)(a) (McKinney 1973).
24. N.Y. CIv. SERV. LAW § 212(1) (McKinney 1973).
25. Id.
26. The Taylor Law's classification of New York City municipal employees as different
from other public employees throughout the rest of the state is "based in reason, and the
different statutory treatment bears a rational relationship to the state interest in allowing
local governments to develop their own machinery to supervise their own public employees."
Civil Serv. Employees Ass'n v. Helsby, 439 F. Supp. 1272, 1279-80 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
27. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE ch. 54 §§ 1173-1.0-13.0 (1975).
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passes. The parameters of the NYCCBL are generally" limited to
"municipal agencies ' ' 9 in New York City while the Taylor Law en-
compasses the remainder of the public sector employees in New
York State.30
The NYCCBL and the Taylor Law each attempt to resolve col-
lective bargaining impasses in the public sector through multi-
tiered dispute resolution procedures. Section II of this Note will
examine the dispute resolution processes of the Taylor Law and
the NYCCBL. Section III will analyze empirically the relative suc-
cesses of both of these laws in resolving disputes, and will make
recommendations as to how to improve their effectiveness.
II. Dispute Resolution Procedures
A. The Taylor Law
The Taylor Law, like the Condon-Wadlin Act," prohibits strikes
by public sector employees.3 2 The Taylor Law, however, goes fur-
ther than the old Condon-Wadlin Act in that it provides for the
resolution of impasses that arise during the course of collective
bargaining.3 " In enacting the Taylor Law, the legislature was at-
tempting to expand on the purely punitive purposes of the Con-
don-Wadlin Act. It stated that the purpose of the Taylor Law is
"to promote harmonious and cooperative relationships between
government and its employees and to protect the public by assur-
ing, at all times, the orderly and uninterrupted operations and
28. See notes 61-66 infra and accompanying text.
29. The NYCCBL covers "all municipal agencies and public employees and public em-
ployee organizations thereof." N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE ch. 54, § 1173-4.0 (1975). "The term
'municipal agency' shall mean an administration, department, division, bureau, office, board,
or-commission, or other agency of the city established under the charter or any other law,
the head of which has appointive powers, and whose employees are paid in whole or in part
from the city treasury. . . ." Id. § 1173-3.0(d). The law is also applicable to "any other
public employer . . . to the extent to which the public employer . . . elects by executive
order to make this chapter applicable. . . ." Id. § 1173-4.0(c) (1975).
30. The Taylor Law defines public employee as "any person holding a position by ap-
pointment or employment in the service of a public employer .. " N.Y. CIv. SERV. LAW
§ 201(7)(a) (McKinney 1973). See also Shelofsky v. Helsby, 32 N.Y.2d 54, 295 N.E.2d 774,
343 N.Y.S.2d 98 (1973).
31. 1958 N.Y Laws, ch. 790.
32. N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW § 210(1) (McKinney 1973).
33. Under the Taylor Law an impasse exists "if the parties fail to achieve agreement at
least 120 days prior to the end of the fiscal year of the public employer." Id. § 209(1).
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functions of government."3 ' The Taylor Law created the Public
Employee Relations Board ("PERB"),35 which determines when an
impasse exists"6 and puts into operation the impasse mechanisms 7
of the Taylor Law.3 8
34. Id. § 200. See also Civil Serv. Employees Ass'n v. Helsby, 31 A.D.2d 325, 297
N.Y.S.2d 813, (3d Dep't), aff'd, 24 N.Y.2d 993, 250 N.E.2d 230, 302 N.Y.S.2d 822 (1969).
35. In addition to the powers the board has under § 209 to settle impasses, see notes 39-
59 infra and accompanying text, the board also has the following powers with respect to the
settling of impasses:
To make available to employee organizations, governments, mediators, fact-finding
boards and joint study committees established by governments and employee organi-
zations statistical data relating to wages, benefits and employment practices in public
and private employment applicable to various localities and occupations to assist
them to resolve complex issues in negotiations.
To establish, after consulting representatives of employee organizations and admin-
strators of public services, panels of qualified persons broadly representative of the
public to be available to serve as mediators, arbitrators or members of fact-finding
boards.
To hold such hearings and make such inquiries as it deems necessary for it prop-
erly to carry out its functions and powers.
For the purpose of such hearings and inquiries, to administer oaths and affirma-
tions, examine witnesses and documents, take testimony and receive evidence, compel
the attendance of witnesses and the production of documents by the issuance of sub-
poenas, and delegate such powers to any member of the board or any person ap-
pointed by the board for the performance of its functions. Such subpoenas shall be
regulated and enforced under the civil practice law and rules.
N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW § 205(5)(H), (1), (J), (K) (McKINNEY 1973).
36. See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
37. N.Y. CIv. SERV. LAW § 209 (McKinney 1973).
38. PERB's findings are reviewable under the Taylor Law which states:
Orders of the board made pursuant to this article shall be deemed to be final
against all parties to its proceedings and persons who have had an opportunity to be
parties to its proceedings unless reversed or modified in proceedings for enforcement
or judicial review as hereinafter provided. Such orders shall be (i) reviewable under
article seventy-eight of the civil practice law and rules upon petition filed by an ag-
grieved party within thirty days after service by registered or certified mail of a copy
of such order upon such party, and (ii) enforceable in a special proceeding, upon
petition of such board, by the supreme court.
Id. § 213(a). Section 213 of the Taylor Law explicitly provides for review under article 78 of
the Civil Practice Laws and Rules ("CPLR") because PERB is classified as an administra-
tive body, whereas decisions by the Board of Collective Bargaining are appealed under arti-
cle 75 of the CPLR because it is considered an arbitration panel. See note 89 infra. See New
York State Pub. Employment Rel. Bd. v. Buffalo Bd. of Educ., 39 N.Y.2d 86, 346 N.E.2d
803, 382 N.Y.S.2d 965 (1976) (article 78 proceeding); Patrolmen's Benev. Ass'n v. City of
New York, 52 A.D.2d 43, 382 N.Y.S.2d 494 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 41 N.Y.2d 205, 359 N.E.2d
1338, 391 N.Y.S.2d 544 (1976) (article 75 proceeding). See generally Koretz & Rabin, Labor
Relations Law, 28 SYRACUSE L. REV. 75, 91-104 (1977); Mironi, The Functional Approach to
Judicial Oversight of Specialized Tribunals - A Case Study, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 745 (1977)
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The first step of the impasse procedure under the Taylor Law is
for PERB to appoint a mediator or mediators from a list of quali-
fied candidates.3 9 If mediation fails to resolve the dispute, PERB
will appoint a fact-finding board of not more than three members °
which shall have the power to make recommendations for resolu-
tion of the dispute after hearing the facts presented by both
sides.4 1 The fact-finding board has the power to submit its findings
to the union and the public employer, and to assist the parties in
voluntary resolution.42
If after the exhaustion of the fact-finding board's methods, an
impasse still exists, PERB has the power to take whatever steps it
deems appropriate to resolve the dispute.4'3 These options include
the making of recommendations after due consideration of the
findings of fact and recommendations of the fact-finding board."
In addition, voluntary interest arbitration is available at the re-
quest of the parties.49
If at this juncture PERB has failed to resolve the impasse, the
final dispute resolution method under the Taylor Law is, in most
cases,46 the legislative hearing. 7 Should either the union or the
[hereinafter cited as The Functional Approach to Judicial Oversight].
39. N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 209(3)(a). See Division 580, Amalgamated Transit Union v.
Central N.Y. Regional Transp. Auth., 556 F.2d 659, 661 (2d Cir. 1977).
40. In the majority of cases one fact-finder is appointed. Interview with Joseph R. Crow-
ley, former member of PERB, in New York City (Jan. 28, 1981).
41. N.Y. CIV. S.RV. LAW § 209(3)(b) (McKinney 1973).
42. Id. § 209(3)(c).
43. Id. § 209(3)(d).
44. Id.
45. Id. The Taylor Committee, in its original report considered, but ultimately rejected
compulsory arbitration. GOVERNOR'S FINA REPORT, supra note 20. The committee ques-
tioned the legality of delegating the legislature's fiscal duties. The New York Court of Ap-
peals, however, in City of Amsterdam v. Helsby, 37 N.Y.2d 19, 332 N.E.2d 290, 371 N.Y.S.2d
404 (1975), subsequently determined that the Taylor Law interest arbitration procedure for
police and firefighters was not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority. Today
the court would probably rule similarly with respect to other state employees holding that
their terms and conditions of employment could also be decided by impartial arbitrators.
See Mount St. Mary's Hosp. v. Catherwood, 26 N.Y.2d 493, 260 N.E.2d 508, 311 N.Y.S.2d
863 (1970) (compulsory arbitration of contract disputes in private voluntary or nonprofit
hospitals held constitutional). See generally McAvoy, Binding Arbitration of Contract
Terms: A New Approach to the Resolution of Disputes in the Public Sector, 72 COLUM. L.
REv. 1192, 1205-08 (1972); Comment, Public Sector Interest Arbitration: Threat to Local
Representative Government?, 9 PAC. L.J. 165 (1978).
46. See notes 53-59 infra and accompanying text.
47. N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 209(3)(e) (McKinney 1973). Section 209 merely authorizes
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public employer not accept in whole or in part the fact-finder's rec-
ommendations, the government-employer must submit to the legis-
lature his recommendations for resolving the dispute' 8 and a copy
of the findings of fact and recommendations of the fact-finding
board. The union may also submit to the legislature its recommen-
dations for settling the dispute.i'
Upon receiving the recommendations of both parties, the legisla-
ture will conduct a public hearing to enable the parties to explain
their positions with respect to the fact-finding board's recommen-
dations.6 0 The legislature will then "take such action as it deems to
be in the public interest, including the interest of the public em-
ployees involved, 15' and may impose the terms and conditions of
employment for union members for a period of up to one year. 51
Not all bargaining impasses, however, may be submitted to the
legislature for resolution .5  Disputes involving the police, "
firefighters, 55 and public schools 5 are exempted by the Taylor Law
from legislative review. If the police or firefighters are a party to
the dispute, and a mediator has been unable to effect a settlement,
PERB will refer the dispute to a public arbitration panel which
will make a final and binding decision. If the public employer,
and does not mandate that the legislature resolve impasses. Lesser v. Suffolk County Class.
& Sal. App. Bd., 74 A.D.2d 842, 425 N.Y.S.2d 391, 392 (2d Dep't 1980).
48. N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 209(3)(e) (McKinney 1973).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. § 209(3)(e)(iv). See Division 580, Amalgamated Transit Union v. Central N.Y.
Regional Transp. Auth., 556 F.2d at 661 (2d Cir. 1977).
52. Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority, 9 N.Y. PUB. EMP. REL. BD. 10-3027
(1977); City of Mount Vernon, 5 N.Y. PuB. EMP. REL. BD. 5-3057 (1972).
53. N.Y. Civ. SERv. LAW §§ 209(3)(f), 209(4) (McKinney Supp. 1980).
54. Id. § 209(4). See City of Corning v. Police, 81 Misc. 2d 294, 366 N.Y.S.2d 241 (Sup.
Ct. 1974).
55. N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW § 209(4) (McKinney Supp. 1980).
56. Id. § 209(3)(f).
57. Id. § 209(4). The arbitration panel is tripartite - one member appointed by the
union, one member appointed by the public employer, and one member appointed jointly by
the public employer and the union. Id. § 209(4)(c)(ii). The Taylor Law is silent concerning
the issue whether the decisions of the arbitration panel should be appealed to the courts via
article 75 or 78 of the CPLR. See Buffalo Police Benev. Ass'n v. City of Buffalo, 81 Misc. 2d
172, 173, 364 N.Y.S.2d 362, 363 (Sup. Ct. 1975) (court concluded that enforcement of the
award issued by the public arbitration panel could only be brought under article 78 of the
CPLR because § 213 of the Taylor Law specifically triggered this section). But cf. Albany
Permanent Professional Firefighters Ass'n, Local 2007 v. City of Corning, 84 Misc. 2d 759,
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however, is a school district, a board of cooperative educational
services, a community college, the State University of New York,
or the City University of New York, there is no final resolution of
the dispute.5 8 In the situation where mediation or fact-finding fails
to resolve the dispute, rather than submit the dispute to the legis-
lature or to an arbitration panel, PERB will continue its concilia-
tory efforts in the form of mediation and fact-finding until the im-
passe is resolved. e
B. New York City Collective Bargaining Law
The NYCCBL, like the Taylor Law, has provisions to resolve
public sector collective bargaining impasses.6 0 Generally, the
NYCCBL has jurisdiction over all public employees in municipal
agencies 6' in New York City62 except for employees of the Transit
Authority, the Board of Education and the Board of Higher Edu-
cation. Other public employers which are not covered automati-
cally, by the NYCCBL such as the Board of Elections, the Health
and Hospitals Corporation, the Housing Authority, the District At-
torneys, and the Off-Track Betting Corporation, have opted to be
covered under the NYCCBL.6 4 Currently there are fifty-six labor
organizations," representing approximately 173,000 employees, 66
under the jurisdiction of the NYCCBL. As with PERB under the
Taylor Law, the NYCCBL is also administered by a board known
761-62, 376 N.Y.S.2d 796, 799 (Sup. Ct. 1975), aff'd, 51 A.D.2d 386, 381 N.Y.S.2d 699 (3d
Dep't), aff'd sub nom. City of Albany v. Public Employment Rel. Bd., 84 Misc. 2d 555, 377
N.Y.S.2d 444 (Sup. Ct. 1976) (court held that article 75 of the CPLR was the appropriate
procedure for judicial review since PERB itself had made no determination and there was
no statutory direction to the contrary). See generally The Functional Approach to Judicial
Oversight, supra note 38.
58. Id. § 209(3)(f).
59. Id.
60. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE ch. 54 § 1173-7.0 (1975).
61. See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
62. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE ch. 54 § 1173-4.0(a)-(b) (1975).
63. N.Y.C. OFFICE OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION OF THE OFFICE
OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 3 (1980) [hereinafter cited as STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION OF OCB].
64. Id. See also N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE ch. 56 § 1173-4.0(c) (1975).
65. STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION OF THE OCB, supra note 63, at 3. Some of the agencies and
departments under the OCB jurisdiction are the Art Commission, Borough Presidents, De-
partment of Parks and Recreation, Department of Sanitation, Fire Department, and the
Police Department. Id. at 3-5.
66. Information provided by Office of Collective Bargaining as the figure reported to the
United States Census Bureau.
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as the Board of Collective Bargaining. 7 The chairman of the
Board is also the director of the Office of Collective Bargaining.68
If an impasse is reached, the director of the Office of Collective
Bargaining has the option, upon the request of a party or upon his
own initiative, to appoint a mediation panel.6 9 Unlike mediation
under the Taylor Law, mediation under the NYCCBL may be by-
passed and the dispute may go directly to the next step of the pro-
cedure - the impasse panel. 0
If the parties exhaust mediation,71 or choose to circumvent this
step, the next procedure is a hearing before the impasse panel.72
The impasse panel normally consists of either one or three mem-
bers, depending upon either the parties' agreements or the decision
of the director absent such agreement.7" The Office of Collective
Bargaining maintains a list of impasse panel members who have
been approved by the Board of Collective Bargaining.74 The direc-
tor submits a list of seven persons to the parties and each party
indicates their preference in numerical order; 75 based upon these
preferences the director will appoint a panel. Additionally, each
party may at its own expense designate a consultant to the impasse
panel who is to be available for assistance.7 6 The NYCCBL em-
powers the impasse panel "to mediate, hold hearings . . . and take
whatever action it considers necessary to resolve the impasse. '7 7 If
mediation fails, the impasse panel will submit its findings and rec-
67. N.Y.C. CHARTER ch. 54 § 1171 (1976). The Board of Collective Bargaining consists of
seven members: two appointed by the city, two appointed by labor, and three impartial
members. Id.
68. Id.
69. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE ch. 56 § 1173-7.0(b)(2) (1975).
70. Id. § 1173-7.0(c).
71. The mediator has no fixed time by which he must resolve the dispute. Interview with
Joseph R. Crowley, former member of PERB, in New York City (Jan. 28, 1981).
72. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE ch. 54 § 1173-7.0(c) (1975).
73. Anderson, MacDonald, and O'Reilly, Impasse Resolution in Public Sector Collective
Bargaining - An Examination of Compulsory Interest Arbitration in New York, 51 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 453, 483-84 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Impasse Resolution in Public Sector
Bargaining].
74. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE ch. 54 § 1173-7.0(c)(1) (1975).
75. Id. § 1173-7.0(c)(2).
76. Id.
77. NYCCBL gives the impasse panel the "power to mediate, hold hearings, compel the
attendance of witnesses and the production of documents, review data, and take whatever
action it considers necessary to resolve the impasse." Id. § 1173-7.0(c)(3)(a).
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ommendations to each party"8 and to the director of the Office of
Collective Bargaining.79 The NYCCBL does not prescribe a dead-
line by which the panel must file a report of its findings and
recommendations."
Within ten days8" after submission of the panel's report, each
party must notify the director and the other party of its accept-
ance or rejection of the panel's recommendations. 2 If either party
fails to notify the board within the ten day period,"3 or if both par-
ties accept the parties' recommendations, the recommendations of
the panel are final and binding.84 A party who rejects in whole or
in part the recommendations of the impasse panel may appeal to
the Board of Collective Bargaining for a review of the recommen-
dations."' The party's notice of appeal to the board must specify
the basis of the appeal, the alleged errors of the panel, and the
modifications requested."' The board will give the parties the op-
portunity to submit briefs and argue before them. After a review
78. Id. § 1173-7.0(c)(3)(d). The impasse panel considers wherever relevant the following
standards in making its recommendations:
(1) comparison of wages, hours, fringe benefits, conditions and characteristics of em-
ployment of the public employees involved in the impasse proceeding with the wages,
hours, fringe benefits, conditions and characteristics of employment of other employ-
ees performing similar work and other employees generally in public or private em-
ployment in New York city [sic] or comparable communities; (2) the overall compen-
sation paid to the employees involved in the impasse proceeding, including direct
wage compensation, overtime and premium pay, vacations, holidays and other ex-
cused time, insurance, pensions, medical and hospitalization benefits, food and ap-
parel furnished, and all other benefits received; (3) changes in the average consumer
prices for goods and services, commonly known as the cost of living; (4) the interest
and welfare of the public; (5) such other factors as are normally and customarily con-
sidered in the determination of wages, hours, fringe benefits, and other working con-
ditions in collective bargaining or in impasse panel proceedings.
Id. § 1173-7.0(c)(3)(b)(1)-(5).
79. Id. § 1173-7.0(c)(3)(d).
80. Id. It is left to the discretion of the director as to when the impasse panel must
submit its report and recommendations to him.
81. Id. § 1173-7.0(c)(3)(e). The NYCCBL provides that the director may, at his discre-
tion, extend the deadline up to 30 days. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. See Patrolmen's Benev. Ass'n v. City of New York, 52 A.D.2d 43, 382 N.Y.S.2d
494 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 41 N.Y.2d 205, 359 N.E.2d 1338, 391 N.Y.S.2d 544 (1976).
85. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE ch. 54 § 1173-7.0(c)(4)(a) (1975).
86. Id. § 1173-7.0(4)(b).
87. Id.
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of the facts, the board, by a majority vote, will affirm or modify the
panel's recommendations in whole or in part."8 This decision is
final and binding upon the parties."
III. Comparative Analysis of the Impasse Procedures
Statistics concerning the number of work stoppages,90 the num-
ber of workers involved in these stoppages, and the number of
man-days idle due to these stoppages, have been compiled for the
five-year period between 1975 and 1979.11
88. Id. § 1173-7.0(4)(c).
89. Id. § 1173-7.0(4)(f). Under article 75 of the CPLR, however, decisions of the Board of
Collective Bargaining are appealable to the courts. N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW §§ 7501-7511 (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1980).
The courts, may review an award as defined by article 75 of the CPLR. The New York
Court of Appeals has held that if both parties to the dispute unequivocally accept the deci-
sion and recommendations of the impasse panel, and thereby foreclose an opportunity to
appeal to the Board of Collective Bargaining, the impasse panel's decision is considered an
award, and this is appealable to the courts under article 75. Patrolmen's Benev. Ass'n v.
City of New York, 52 A.D.2d 43, 382 N.Y.S.2d 494 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 41 N.Y.2d 205, 359
N.E.2d 1338, 391 N.Y.S.2d 544 (1976). See note 38 supra.
90. The Taylor Law defines strike as "any strike or other concerted stoppage of work or
slowdown by public employees." N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW § 201(9) (McKinney 1973). See also
School Dist. v. United Teachers Inc., 85 Misc. 2d 282, 287, 378 N.Y.S.2d 881, 886 (Sup. Ct.
1975), where the court held that the teachers' failure to attend a "Back-to-School Night"
constituted a strike under § 201(9) of the Taylor Law. Police officers who, during a three
day period, stopped city buses, sanitation trucks and sewer maintenance vehicles, and de-
tained them for time-consuming inspections, and who had abstained from performance of
other duties necessary to the effective functioning of the police, engaged in a strike within
the meaning of the Taylor Law because this three day period was commensurate with a
campaign to induce city officials to rescind an order which had demoted certain high rank-
ing police officials for budgeting reasons. Dowling v. Bowen, 53 A.D.2d 862, 385 N.Y.S.2d
355, 356 (Sup. Ct. 1976). For a full discussion on what constitutes a strike see [1977] LRX
(BNA) § 2 at 672-73.
91. The statistics collected were supplied by the Office of Collective Bargaining and the
Public Employee Relations Board, although some of the information had to be extrapolated
due to lack of recordation by these agencies as of January 5, 1981.
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An analysis of the statistics reveals that during this five year pe-
riod more negotiations have ended in strikes under the jurisdiction
of the Taylor Law than under the jurisdiction of the NYCCBL.9"
From 1975 to 1979 there were eighty-nine strikes under the Taylor
Law jurisdiction, whereas under the NYCCBL's jurisdiction there
were only seven.93 Similarly, the percentage of workers involved in
strikes, and the percentage of man-days idle due to strikes was
higher under the Taylor Law jurisdiction than under the NYCCBL
jurisdiction.94 Under the Taylor Law during this period 2.49% of
all workers were involved in strikes, whereas only 1.36% of all the
workers under the jurisdiction of the NYCCBL were involved in
strikes. 5 Additionally, .062% of the work year under the Taylor
Law's jurisdiction was idle due to strikes, contrasted to .052% of
the work year lost to strike time under the NYCCBL's
jurisdiction."'
Not only were there comparatively more stoppages, more work-
ers involved, and more man-days idle under the Taylor Law's juris-
diction during this five-year period, but during almost every year
these statistics increased under the Taylor Law's jurisdiction.9 7
The trend clearly indicates that negotiations were more likely to
result in a strike under the Taylor Law's jurisdiction than under
the NYCCBL jurisdiction.
There are a number of reasons why there were almost thirteen
times as many strikes under the Taylor Law's jurisdiction than
under the NYCCBL's jurisdiction. The most significant reason is
the ineffective dispute resolution techniques under the Taylor
Law. Although it must be recognized that not all strikes are the
direct consequence of the failure of the impasse procedure to oper-
ate successfully,9 8 the impasse procedures nevertheless must be
92. See note 91 supra.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. The exception to this trend occurred in 1976. Although under the jurisdiction of the
NYCCBL there was only one stoppage compared to 14 under the Taylor Law's jurisdiction,
the NYCCBL jurisdiction had a higher percentage of workers involved in strikes and a
higher percentage of man-days idle due to a four day strike by 18,000 public employees of
Local 1420, AFSCME, D.C. 37, who struck the New York City Health and Hospital Corpo-
ration. Information furnished to author by OCB (Jan. 5, 1981).
98. Strikes can be the result of a multiplicity of factors such as animosity towards the
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carefully scrutinized because their purpose is to minimize the inci-
dence of strikes.99
The basis for the success of any dispute resolution mechanism is
the acceptance of the procedure by those who must abide by its
decisions.100 The NYCCBL, unlike the legislatively imposed Taylor
Law, may be more likely to achieve acceptance by those who must
abide by its decisions because it was written with both union and
city input. 01
In early 1965, Mayor Robert F. Wagner and the leadership of
the major unions of city employees agreed to attempt to devise a
mutually palatable set of procedures to resolve bargaining im-
passes.102 A tripartite panel was established consisting of repre-
sentatives of the mayor on one side, representatives of the munici-
pal labor committee 03 on the other side, and four "public
members" who acted as an impartial third party.04 The municipal
labor committee represented approximately one hundred unions
and 200,000 city employees, thereby helping to make the law more
responsive to those employees it would affect.10 5 The essential
point is that for the first time impasse procedures were established
through a negotiated agreement'" thus enjoying a higher degree of
acceptability because the agreement represented and reflected the
views of both parties.
employer, safety, union politics, severe fiscal constraints, or one of a number of other rea-
sons besides the failure of the dispute resolution process. See 29 U.S.C. § 143 (1976) for
permissible work stoppages due to safety hazards. The Supreme Court in Gateway Coal Co.
v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368 (1974), held that employees can walk off their jobs if they believe the
working conditions to be unsafe and if there is "ascertainable, objective evidence" to sup-
port their contention that an abnormally dangerous condition exists. Id. at 387.
99. See notes 12-15 supra and accompanying text.
100. See generally Public Policy and the Law, supra note 18; Comment, The Taylor
Law, The OCB and the Public Employee, 35 BROOKLYN L. REv. 214 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as The Taylor Law].
101. The Taylor Law, supra note 100, at 218-19.
102. Exec. Order No. 49 (1958). Prior to 1965 the city of New York operated under Exec-
utive Order 49 which encouraged city employees to join unions and engage in a form of
collective bargaining, but which provided no viable method for resolving collective bargain-
ing disputes.
103. The Municipal Labor Committee is an organization of unions representing city em-
ployees. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE ch. 54 §§ 1173-3.0(k), 1173-9.0 (1975).
104. See The Taylor Law, supra note 100, at 218-20.
105. Id. at 218.
106. Id. at 219.
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Another factor that hampers the effectiveness of the Taylor Law
to resolve disputes is the rigidity of its impasse procedures.10 7 The
Taylor Law automatically requires that, upon the finding of an im-
passe,""8 the first step of the dispute resolution process must be
mediation. 0 9 This step is a prerequisite for the utilization of other
finality procedures. The NYCCBL, unlike the Taylor Law, does
not automatically require mediation upon the finding of an im-
passe, 10 nor is it a requirement for the utilization of other finality
procedures."' Mediation is imposed under the NYCCBL only if
the director determines that "collective bargaining negotiations
.. .would be aided by mediation.""' 2 This affords the NYCCBL,
unlike the Taylor Law, sufficient flexibility to respond to any situa-
tion which may arise." 3
Time constraints also increase the rigidity of the Taylor Law.
The implementation of the various impasse procedures of the Tay-
lor Law are geared to the fiscal year of the employer."14 Although
the implementation of the procedures are somewhat flexible," 6 the
fiscal year timetable is generally adhered to. The NYCCBL, how-
ever, accords the director and the parties wide latitude" 6 with re-
107. Theodore Kheel has criticized the inflexibility of the impasse procedures of the
Taylor Law during his involvement in the New York City transit negotiations of December
1967. Mr. Kheel has stated:
In the early hours of 1968, within minutes of the expiration date of the contract a
transit strike was averted. But the settlement was reached, at least in part, because
some aspects of the machinery established by the new [Taylor] law were not
used. . . .The Board appointed to resolve the dispute was given broader author-
ity. . . .This flexibility was insisted upon and it proved effective in avoiding a strike.
Id. at 230 (quoting Kheel, Report to Speaker Anthony J. Travia on the Taylor Law, 101
(1968)).
108. Under § 209(1) of the Taylor Law "an impasse may be deemed to exist if the par-
ties fail to achieve agreement at least 120 days prior to the end of the fiscal year of the
public employer." (emphasis supplied) N.Y. CIv. SERV. LAW § 209(1) (McKinney 1973).
PERB has interpreted this section to mean that the word may implies that PERB "is not
obligated to conclude that a true impasse exists simply by reason of the advent of the 120-
day period." In re Uniformed Firefighters Ass'n v. City of Mount Vernon, 11 N.Y. PuB. EMP.
REL. BD. 11-3095, (1978).
109. N.Y. CIv. SERV. LAW § 209(3)(a) (McKinney 1973).
110. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE ch. 54 § 1173-7.0(b)(2) (1975).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See The Taylor Law, supra note 100, at 230-31.
114. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW §§ 209(1), (3)(c) (McKinney 1973).
115. See, e.g., N.Y. CIv. SERV. LAW § 209(3)(c) (McKinney 1973) which gives PERB the
discretion to extend the fact-finding period.
116. The NYCCBL places no time constraints on the mediation or fact-finding process.
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spect to the implementation of the impasse procedures, thereby al-
lowing the Office of Collective Bargaining to respond differently to
various collective bargaining impasses.
If a dispute is not resolved to the satisfaction of both parties it
can be appealed to the Board of Collective Bargaining under the
NYCCBL, 1 7 or to the legislature under the Taylor Law."' This
final step in the attempt to resolve collective bargaining disputes
has caused much debate and concern." 9 The NYCCBL provides
that a final determination by the Board of Collective Bargaining
shall be final and binding.'20 The Board of Collective Bargaining is
an impartial body,' 2  whereas under the Taylor Law, the final
method for resolving the dispute is a decision rendered by the "leg-
islative body of the government involved."' 2 2
The effect of the Taylor Law is to place the final decision'2 3 con-
cerning the terms and conditions of employment into the political
arena. Placing the resolution of disputes into a legislative forum
allows politicians to dictate the terms and conditions of employ-
ment for public employees. Politicians can be viewed as impartial
since they have a vested interest in keeping wages low, thereby
providing the citizen with services at a low cost. Labor leader
Victor Gotbaum argues that the final step in the Taylor Law al-
lows the employer to make the ultimate unilateral decision.' 2'
Not only does the Taylor Law provide an ineffective means for
N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE ch. 54 §§ 1173-7.0(b), (c) (1975).
117. Id. § 1173-7.0(c)(4)(a).
118. N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW § 209(3)(e) (McKinney 1973). See notes 47-52 supra and ac-
companying text.
119. Theodore Kheel has said "the legislature should not become a participant in the
negotiations; it should limit its role to a consideration of the most effective steps to resolve
the dispute, including the possibility of referring the matter to binding arbitration as a last
resort." Kheel, The Taylor Law: A Critical Examination of its Virtues and Defects, 20
SYRACUSE L. REv. 181, 191 (1969) [hereinafter cited as The Taylor Law: A Critical Exami-
nation]. Victor Gotbaum has stated that "no serious observer can view the dispute resolu-
tion techniques of the [Taylor] Act as anything but a total negation of the concept of collec-
tive bargaining." Gotbaum, Finality in Collective Bargaining Disputes: The New York
Experience, 21 CATH. U. L. REV. 589, 591 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Finality in Collective
Bargaining].
120. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE ch. 54 § 1173-7.0(c)(4)(f) (1975).
121. N.Y.C. CHARTER ch. 54 § 1171 (1976). See also note 67 supra.
122. N.Y. Civ. SERv. LAW § 209(3)(e) (McKinney 1973).
123. See notes 47-52 supra and accompanying text.
124. Finality in Collective Bargaining, supra note 119, at 591.
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dispute resolution, but in some cases the law provides virtually no
effective dispute resolution procedures at all."15 Teachers have no
right to a final and binding decision by either the legislature or by
an arbitration panel.'12 The Taylor Law was amended in 1974 so
that a final determination of terms and conditions of employment
in the event of an impasse during negotiations of a teachers agree-
ment would not be decided by the "legislative body of the govern-
ment involved.112 7 This was amended so that the final decision
concerning the negotiations would be removed from the discretion
of the school board.'2 8 Previously, a school board could be involved
in the negotiations and then ultimately be the final arbitrator of
the agreement. When the Taylor Law was amended to exclude the
teachers from legislative review, no alternative procedure was
designed to resolve teacher disputes, thereby leaving a void if an
impasse is reached. 2 ' Based on the relative success of the dispute
resolution procedures of the NYCCBL, the legislature should enact
similar interest arbitration procedures for school teachers.
IV. Conclusion
The statistics indicate that during the five-year period between
1975 and 1979 strikes were more prevalent under the Taylor Law
than under the NYCCBL. This result may be explained in part by
the differing dispute resolution techniques utilized under each law.
If workers are to respect this outside dictation of wages and
working conditions, they must perceive the dispute resolution
mechanism as equitable. Theodore Kheel has said, "[r]espect and
compliance must depend on the apparent and innate fairness of
the legal system governing the employment relationship.' se At
this juncture the Taylor Law does not provide the most expedi-
tious and judicious methods for resolving public sector disputes.
125. When an impasse is reached during negotiations with teachers the Taylor Law does
provide for mediation and fact-finding. N.Y. CIv. SERv. LAW §§ 209(3)(a), (b) (McKinney
1973).
126. Id. § 209(3)(f) (McKinney Supp, 1980).
127. Id.
128. See Impasse Resolution in Public Sector Collective Bargaining, supra notei73, at
483-84.
129. In the event an impasse continues, PERB will continue conciliatory efforts through
mediation and fact-finding and sometimes will conduct show-cause hearings. Interview with
Joseph R. Crowley, former member of PERB, in New York City (Jan. 28, 1981).
130. The Taylor Law: A Critical Examination, supra note 119, at 184.
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What is needed is a flexible method for resolving disputes which
culminates in a final and binding decision by a neutral panel. Until
this end is achieved, there will continue to be a proliferation of
public sector strikes.
Robert H. Platt

